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An attorney I work with sent me a link to the following Fox News article, Doctors, Hospital Workers Suspended for Viewing George Clooney’s Medical Records. For more news check out Google News search.
The article indicates that 40 employees at Palisades Medical Center in North Bergen, NJ were suspended for violating the hospital’s HIPAA policies and procedures.
Based on the information in the article I suspect that the employees were found to have violated the minimum necessary provisions under the HIPAA Privacy Rule. This section of the rule provides:
For uses of protected health information, the covered entitys policies and procedures must identify the persons or classes of persons within the covered entity who need access to the information to carry out their job duties, the categories or types of protected health information needed, and conditions appropriate to such access.
As more news comes out about this I suspect this might serve as a good example of application of the minimum necessary requirements under HIPAA. If the employees further disclosed the information to third parties outside the hospital (including the media) other provisions of HIPAA might also come into play. George Clooney and HIPAA Minimum Necessary Rule
Eric Eyre reports in today’s Sunday Gazette-Mail that Governor Manchin has rejected the proposed new Certificate of Need CT Standards approved by the West Virginia Health Care Authority last month.
The article indicates Governor Manchin sent a letter to the Authority’s Board on Friday, December 7, asking that they re-examine the imaging equipment proposal and submit a revised plan. The article also indicates that Governor Manchin rejected the proposed new standards on the basis that the standards did not require physicians to accept low income patients.
For more background on the proposed new standards see my previous posts - here and here.
UPDATE (12/10/07): Governor Manchin’s December 7, 2007 letter to the WVHCA. Governor Manchin Rejects New Certificate of Need CT Standards
I am working at this very moment on a short commentary for a law review tentatively titled (the law review does not know this yet), New FAQs for the War on Terror: Questions That Counterterrorism Policy Must Answer in a New Administration.
I am gradually developing a list of questions that constitute questions that define the policy divide on various matters of law. In no order at all - really completely disorganized - and without trying to make the language pretty or pithy, here is the beginning of the list:
Is administration detention in principle ever permissible? Or must it always come down to, as the UN special rapporteur asserted in a debate a couple of weeks ago with me at ASIL, try them in a reasonable time or let them go, and that principle transcends whatever specific, technical legal structure you employ?
Can ordinary criminal trials, without special recourse, adequately serve counterterrorism needs?
Can you use some structure for trials that is outside the existing criminal law framework?
Note that legal conservatives Rivkin and Casey oppose the move to a national security court precisely because they believe that only commander in chief authority and the law of war provide the constitutional basis not to have ordinary criminal trials. It is the conservative analogue to the position of the rights groups: they likewise do not think that you can constitutionally have special procedures even if it is “civilian.”
Is waterboarding torture, or otherwise always impermissible?
In interrogation practices, does it matter what you know about the person - their degree of knowledge and culpability - - and the risk to others reasonably assessed - situational ethics, so to speak - in determining what you can permissibly do to them short of torture, however specifically defined? Are you allowed to do to KSM things, while still short of torture, that you are not allowed to do to someone about whom you know nothing?
Will the citizen (and resident alien, really) v noncitizen distinction continue to apply; and will the territorial v nonterritorial distinction continue to apply in counterterroism legal regimes?
The current administration position is that citizens cannot be subjected to illegal enemy combatant treatment. Increasingly, rational terrorist groups will seek to recruit Americans or American passport holders - the situation will come to resemble that of Western Europe, where the terrorists are “yours” - and a special legal regime premised on noncitizenship or nonterritoriality will not do what you intended when designed around Guantanamo Afghan prisoners.
Is it okay to change the legal criminal rules for CIA personnel midstream?
Ex post facto problems? Simple fairness? Consider how much of the wrangling in the Judiciary Committee has really had this as the predicate unstated.
What must and should be got from Congress, and what is the obligation of the judiciary to defer to the united political branches on counterterrorism and national security policy?
Will the judiciary defer? Heck if I know.
What is the application of international human rights law to all of this, apart from domestic US law?
How should it interact with the laws of war in the existing situation, and what about its application to the US domestically or abroad?
How should future detentions be governed?
Under what structure? Nearly all the existing regimes have been built around the “legacy” Afghan prisoners. Over time, however, new adminsitrations will almost certainly detain people who might or might not be citiziens, might or mght not be in the United States.
Most importantly at this moment - not a hypothetical category - the US is currently detaining thousands of people in Iraq, including a large number of foreign jihadis. A possibly unavoidable issue for a later administration is what happens to those jihadis whom the United States has concluded it cannot try for any particular crime but whom it cannot let go free - to go make jihad in Iraq again, or Afhstanistan or Pakistan or thailand or Indonesia or Malaysia etc. What should it do?
When will any of this get taken up in a serious way, if ever?
(And, most important, why can’t I use block quotes or bullets without screwing up the letter justification on Blogger?) A first draft, disorganized list of questions for counterterrorism policy to answer in a new administration
Julian Ku, over at Opinio Juris, here, mentions a conference at Brooklyn Law School on corporate liability in international law. I share much of Julian’s view, briefly expressed in this post. I’d add that in informal discussions with non-US international lawyers, they not infrequently express discomfort at the way in which ATS law in the US is evolving and going its own way - a kind of specialized US version of international law for purposes of ATS litigation. It puts them in a difficult situation, because they frequently like the results but dislike the process and what it suggests for the fragmentation of international law as US courts do their own thing with it. Hence the frequent hesitation to pronounce publicly on the issue.
I do hope the Brooklyn conference will publish something, however; the problem, of course, is that there are lots and lots and lots and lots of academic conferences on this topic, not infrequently organized by my school, consisting of academics and politically committed students announcing a political agenda in the hushed tones of academic international law, and never giving a thought to actual arguments on the other side. Whereas, in these areas, it’s not just policy arguments on the other side, there are lots of doctrinal ones, textual ones under international law.
Reaching the conclusions reached by the ATS courts on things like civil liability for corporations in these cases requires unabashedly heroic assumptions. Or else it requires what Judge Weinstein did in his last Agent Orange case: simply a lofty assertion that it would be inconceivable that a US court would avoid imposing tort liability because of the corporate form, but thereby negating the altogether quite conceivable implication, however, because that is the plainest reading of the treaty law, that international law (at least if you get away from what American professors and their students think) does not actually conceive of either corporate liability as such or civil liability for corporations as such. It is an interesting form of the sucker’s bet, really: ATS litigation today consists of wanting to have (and mostly getting) all the goodies and none of the burdens of US domestic law in international human rights litigation, while wanting to have all the of the goodies and none of the burdens of international law. Julian Ku brief note on Brooklyn conference on corporate liability in international law and ATS cases